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Since the 1985 Farm Bill is not yet law, it is not possible 
to discuss specific provisions. However, both the House and 
Senate have passed their versions of the Farm Bill. It is 
possible to examine these two Bills for broad areas of agreement 
and to discuss their potential implications for u.s. 
agriculture. For brevity, my observations are confined to four 
areas of agreement: (1) conservation programs, (2) export 
enhancement programs, (3) "self-help" programs, and (4) loan 
rates/target prices. 
Before discussing these areas, I will address a question 
asked by many farmers and others: Why has the Bill taken so 
long? The reasons are helpful in understanding why the House and 
Senate farm bills are drafted as they are. 
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Why the Farm Bill Has Taken so Long 
Reasons for the delay are many, but three stand out: (1) 
continuing deterioration in the farm credit situation, (2) 
failure of the Reagan Administration to present a viable farm 
bill, and (3) budget constraints. A brief discussion of each 
reason follows. 
Farm Credit Crisis 
Although some observers had warned of the financial problems 
facing agriculture, the farm credit crisis did not become part of 
the national agenda until Senator Melcher of Montana held 
hearings in Washington, D.C. in February 1985. A subsequent 
filibuster. over the nomination of Edwin Meese to be Attorney 
General paved the way for the senate and House to pass a farm 
credit assistance package aimed at assuring farmers credit for 
planting. 
President Reagan vetoed the credit relief bill, but farm 
credit was on the national agenda. Congress could not ignore the 
interrelationship between the farm bill and the credit crisis. 
Importantly, the farm bill assumed not only its traditional price 
and income support role but also a credit relief role. Congress 
had to consider what impact reducing government support would 
have on the credit situation. 
Preoccupation of Congress with the farm credit crisis during 
February caused the Senate and House Agricultural Committees to 
postpone hearings on the farm bill by at least one month. From 
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the very beginning, work on the farm bill started late. 
Administration's Farm Bill 
The traditional start to markup (i.e., writing) the farm bill 
is the secretary of Agriculture's testimony before Congress on 
the Administration's farm bill. This year's traditional start 
was in most respects without meaning. The Administration's farm 
bill, "The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1985," was a radical 
program that essentially moved agriculture to a free market over 
a six year period. Most farm groups and farm state legislators 
labeled the program reckless and irresponsible. It went too far, 
too fast in their eyes, and would increase the financial 
difficulty facing farmers. 
Whatever the merits of the Administration's position, it was 
"dead on departure" as far as political realities were 
concerned. The Administration undermined much of its influence 
over the farm bill by proposing and maintaining such an extreme 
position. It provided little initial foundation for marking-up a 
farm bill. Both the Senate and House Agricultural Committees 
chose as their markup vehicles the bills submitted by their 
respective chairmen, Senator Helms and Representative de la 
Garza. The result was further delay in writing the farm bill. 
It should be noted the much maligned "Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1985" proposed lowering loan rates and setting them 
through a moving average of market prices. Both proposals will 
be in the final farm bill. 
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Budget Constraints 
The federal deficit of around $200 billion annually has 
surfaced as a major national agenda item. In 1985, Congress took 
a significant step to at least control further increases in the 
deficit. The "Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 1986" called for 
cuts of $55 billion in federal spending. While most experts 
believe the actual cuts will be $35-$40 billion, the fact is 
Congress got serious about cutting federal spending to balance 
the deficit. 
At present, a Congressional conference committee is 
considering a far more comprehensive budget reduction package. 
The so-called "Gramm-Rudman" approach will automatically balance 
the budget by 1991 through across the board cuts in most federal 
programs, excluding antipoverty and social security programs. 
Passage of "Gramm-Rudman" could force reductions in farm price 
and income supports no matter wh~t the provisions of the 1985 
farm bill. 
Farm programs no longer enjoy an open check book. The 
"Budget Resolution" allocated about $35 billion over the 1986-88 
fiscal years for farm income and price support programs. This 
figure amounts to an average annual expenditure in excess of 40 
percent of average annual net farm income over the last three 
years. However, the $35 billion represents a cut of $6-8 billion 
during fiscal 1986-88 in anticipated outlays given continuation 
of current programs Thus, it represents a significant constraint 
on farm expenditures. 
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Budget constraints have caused substantial disagreement over 
how farm programs should operate in an era of tightening fiscal 
control and how the projected costs of the 1985 farm bill should 
be contained. These points of debate, along with the farm credit 
crisis and the Administration's farm bill stance, substantially 
slowed progress of the farm bill through Congress. 
selected Common Themes in the House and Senate Farm Bills 
Strong Conservation Programs 
A common feature of the House and Senate farm bills is a 
strong commitment to soil conservation. Both bills contain 
"sodbuster" and "swampbuster" provisions. These provisions deny 
farm program benefits to fanners who "break-out" (plant crops on) 
newly cultivated lands designated as highly erodible or 
wetlands. Program benefits are denied for all crops produced, 
not just those produced on the broken-out erodible lands or 
wetlands. 
The bills also require farmers to apply accepted conservation 
practices on already cultivated land designated as erodible or 
risk losing farm program benefits. The Senate bill requires 
approved practices to be in place by 1988 while the House bill 
sets 1995 as the compliance date. 
Lastly, the two bills contain a long term conservation 
reserve for fragile land already in crop production. The reserve 
will be at least 25 million acres. Farmers will bid for a per 
acre payment in return for removing the land from 
production for at least seven years. Payment will most likely be 
in cash but could be in commodities accor.ding to the House bill 
for five million acres. The Secretary of Agriculture will also 
pr.ovide aid for up to 50 percent of the cost of installing 
approved cover cr.ops or conservation practices. 
Public support for strong conservation measures have 
increased since the erosion impact of "fence-row-to-fence-row" 
planting was felt in the late 1970s. Their inclusion in the 1985 
Farm Bill primarily represents the efforts of conservation groups 
such as the American Farmland Trust, Audubon Society, and Sierra 
Club. Although many farm groups climbed on board the 
conservation freight train in 1985, they were basically minor 
players in what will probably be the most novel programs in the 
farm bill. 
Taken as a group, the conservation provisions represent a 
return to the philosophy of the ~arm programs of the 1930s. 
Farmers as a group are expected to pr.actice good soil stewardship 
in return for feder.al farm program benefits. The conser.vation 
provisions also illustrate that new thrusts in farm (any) 
legislation normally have an incubation period of five to ten 
year.s before the national agenda allows commitment to the new 
legislative thrusts. 
Strong Export Enhancement Programs 
Both the Senate and House farm bills contain a strong 
commitment to export enhancement. Both reauthorize the Food for 
Peace program (P.L. 480) and increase its size. Both reauthor-ize 
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the short term export credit guarantee program and reauthorize 
and broaden the intermediate term (three to ten year) export 
credit program. Both bills also direct the Secretary of 
Agriculture to carry out an export payment-in-kind program and to 
use commodity export assistance to counter subsidies offered by 
foreign competitors. 
The strong export market development programs reflect a 
consensus among Congressional and Administration leaders that 
export enhancement programs offer a substantial method to boost 
demand, thereby reducing burdensome surpluses and increasing net 
farm income. The aggressive stance also reflects growing 
Congressional concern over the in-roads foreign producers have 
made into traditional American markets for farm as well as 
industrial and other commodities. As far as export enhance1nent 
programs are concerned, agriculture has benefited from the very 
broad national concern o~er the American trade imbalance. 
The export programs in the farm bill will result in an 
increase in the proportion of farm exports shipped under some 
form of federal assistance. In fiscal year 1984, 15 percent of 
agricultural exports were shipped under either P.L. 480 or 
Commodity Credit Corporation credit programs. It is highly 
possible this proportion could rise to one-quarter or more of 
u.s. exports o~er the next three years. 
Self-Help Programs 
During the last quarter century, an increasing number of 
producer funded checkoffs have been established for different 
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agricultural commodities at the national or state level. These 
checkoffs fund research and market ~romotion efforts. The 1985 
Farm Bill represents a major addition to this legacy. It 
contains provisions concerning national checkoffs for beef and 
pork. Furthermore, responding to suggestions from the major beef 
and pork commodity organizations, the producer referendum to 
certify the checkoff will be delayed until at least one year. 
after the checkoff begins. The argument is that this delay gives 
producers a chance to judge the effectiveness of the checkoff. 
These two referendums reinforce what this author believes is 
a growing trend among public officials and representatives to ask 
agriculture to help itself. Checkoffs are one aspect of 
self-help. Another is producer assessments (taxes} to help 
finance commodity price support programs. The no-net cost 
tobacco program and the recently completed dairy diversion 
program are examples. The House bill contains an extension of 
this approach by authorizing a producer tax to cover the cost of 
a whole herd dairy buyout program, another dairy diversion 
program, and the cost of purchasing surplus milk above 5 billion 
pounds. 
The trend to ask agriculture to help itself can be traced in 
part to the increasing cost of government income and price 
support programs. It can also be traced to the fact that 
farmers are becoming fewer and larger. Furthermore, large 
farmers acquire the largest share of farm program benefits. 
Increasingly, questions are being asked such as do large farmers 
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need federal help and, even if they do, should it be extended 
given their size? A producer self-help program is one answer to 
these questions: producers are taxed in proportion to the 
benefits they receive from federal programs. 
Loan Rates and Target Prices 
Both the Senate and House farm bills continue the current 
nonrecourse loan programs. For wheat, feed grains, cotton, and 
rice, loan rates will decline but no more than five percent per 
year. Eventually, the loan rate will be set at 75-85 percent of 
the five year moving average of market prices minus the high and 
low price. In addition, both bills permit the Secretary of 
Agriculture to further r.educe the loan rates through either a 
marketing loan or "Findley" adjustment. The Findley adjustment 
allows the Secretary to reduce the loan rate if the Secretary 
determines lowe~ loan rates are needed to maintain price 
competitiveness. Both bills give the Secretary discretionary 
authority to use the Findley adjustment. The Senate farm bill 
requires the Secretary to offer a marketing loan. Under this 
provision, commodity loans could be repaid at a rate lower than 
the nonrecourse loan rate. The House bill makes a marketing loan 
optional at the Secretary's discretion. Lastly, the House bill 
sets a $250,000 limitation on nonrecourse loans; none exists in 
the Senate bill. As an aside, the soybean loan rate will also 
decline but, given the substantial differences between the Senate 
and House farm bills, the soybean program will have to be worked 
out by the farm bill conference committee. 
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The senate bill contains a one year. continuation of 1985 
target prices. For 1987 and later crops, target prices can drop 
by up to five percent a year. However, in 1987 the Secretary is 
required to make up any reduction in target prices with 
payment-in-kind of governmant-owned commodities, and in 1988 the 
secretary must pay up to five percent of the target price with 
commodities, to the extent they are available. Thus, the Senate 
Bill effectively has a two year target price freeze. 
The House bill has a two year target price freeze at 1985 
levels. Up to a five percent annual reduction is permitted for 
1988 and later crops, but only if the cost of production declines 
at least five percent from the previous year. Most experts agree 
this translates into a five year freeze (the House bill covers 
five crop years). 
Both bills maintain the $50,000 limit on deficiency payments 
except the Senate bill eliminat£s the limit for. cotton and rice. 
Excluded from the payment limitation are any payments that come 
from discretionary reduction in loan rates by the secretary of 
Agriculture or payments under a marketing loan. 
The net effect of likely loan rate and target price 
provisions in the farm bill are: 
(1) loan rates will decline over the foreseeable future; 
(2) given current surplus production and the inelastic short 
term demand for agricultural commodities, market prices will 
decline as loan rates decline1 
(3) maximum possible deficiency payment per bushel or pound 
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of co~nodity will increase as loan rates decline and target 
prices remain frozen even if only for one year; 
(4) the increasing maximum deficiency payment will increase 
budgetary exposure at least in the short term; 
(5} increasing budget exposure will argue for either larger 
land set-asides or, if "Gramm-Rudman" passes, decreases in 
target prices beyond those specified in the farm bill. 
The end result is that farm income will come under pressure from 
declining market prices, increasing land set asides, and 
potential cuts due to "Gramm-Rudman." This conclusion stems not 
so much from the specific form of the 1985 farm bill as from the 
current surplus production situation and increasing national 
concern over the budget deficit. 
summary and Conclusions 
The 1985 Farm Bill will confirm the old adage that farm 
policy is evolutionary, not revolutionary. The basic mechanisms 
in the 1985 Farm Bill will be the same ones as in the 1981 Farm 
Bill. But, the 1985 Farm Bill has its novel features. The 
conservation programs represent a strong return to the idea that 
farmers as a group should practice good soil management in return 
for federal assistance. Furthermore, a major decision has been 
made: for better or worse, farm policy will be more market 
oriented. This is the same decision made in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The bottom line is that the 1985 Farm Bill will provide 
producers experiencing financial stress a "window of opportunity" 
for at least one year, probably two, but not more than four to 
dddress their problems. National p~eoccupation with the budget 
deficit means the level of farm support will have to decline in 
the near future. With surplus production, that unfortunately 
translates into lower farm income. 
